The Future is in the Balance

The question of the duality of Jordan’s external policies can now be understood more clearly. This duality has led to an unresolvable tension in Jordan’s foreign policy between the requirements of “day-to-day” state business on the one hand and the long-term strategic objective of rejuvenating the Arab world on the other. Jordan’s regional behavior can therefore be characterized as a balancing act between short-term interests and long-term goals.

The Economic Restructuring Program

In relation to the country’s regional relations, Jordan’s three primary policy goals embody a mixture of both short-term and long-term interests. Since 1989, massive efforts have been underway to restructure and revitalize Jordan’s economy. Foreign policy in relation to this program has been largely designed to attract assistance in the form of grants and loans, debt cancellation or rescheduling, as well as technical know-how, in order to better achieve the adjustment goals. Also relevant to foreign policy in this regard are agreements concerning the opening of export markets and steps to attract private sector investments. All of these are examples of the country seeking to maximize its interests by pursuing external actions that promote economic growth.

Democratization and Human Rights

At the other end of the spectrum is Jordan’s promotion of democratic government and human rights. Although no one can claim that Jordan is yet a full democracy—if, in fact, any “full democracies” exist anywhere—the country’s success in its democratic path has encouraged the leadership to present Jordan as a model for others to emulate. The late King Hussein repeatedly made clear his belief that non-democratic regimes should gradually democratize themselves from within, or most probably they will be changed by popular pressures and demands for democracy. Jordan presents its own experiment as a model for others with similar inclinations to follow. However, Jordan does not deliberately export its democratic ideology to other countries.

The Arab-Israeli Peace Process

Jordan’s third primary policy track concerns the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the Kingdom has long favored a peaceful solution to the problem—in fact, King Hussein was one of the original authors of UNSC Resolution 242, which first spelled out the formula of “land for peace”—the origins of the current process date from the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. While the economic restructuring program is clearly designed to maximize tangible economic benefits for the country, and democratization is in the long-term strategic interests of Jordan and the region, the peace process holds a mixture of economic and political benefits that are visible in the short term, as well as strategic dividends which will only come to fruition with time.

The stability achieved by peace has brought increased investment as well as a boom in the tourism sector. Jordan has also benefited in an even clearer way, as its treaty with Israel guaranteed its rightful water share and returned its occupied lands. By ensuring the security of its western border, Jordan has also been able to reduce the size of its armed forces and rechannel this money into programs to strengthen the social safety net, thus easing its economic restructuring program. The interaction between the peace process and the restructuring program was also reinforced when a number of states agreed to write off or reschedule Jordan’s debt repayments after it signed a peace treaty with Israel. The massive debt, which amounted to 200% of the GDP in 1988, and reached a high of US$ 8.9 billion at the end of 1990, threatened the success of the economic adjustment program. The centerpiece of the country’s debt reduction program was the write-off by the United States of approximately US$ 700 million in 1995.

Click for the map of the Jordanian Regained Lands

While the Treaty of Peace with Israel has brought the aforementioned immediate benefits, Jordan is actively promoting an overall peace settlement which will free the peoples of the region from the burdens of war and give them the opportunities necessary to build a better future. Much of the vast wealth that is currently spent on arms can be redirected to promote development. A healthy regional peace also promises to spur political participation and a greater appreciation of human rights, as the absence of an Israeli military threat will make justifying authoritarian police states and large armies more difficult.

A comprehensive and just peace will also allow the states of the Middle East to cooperate in confronting what may be the greatest regional challenge, the lack of water. In the sphere of economics, regional peace will help to boost investment, and greater trust and openness between states should allow for freer trade and more joint economic programs. Indeed, the world is moving towards free trade and Jordan’s restructuring program is designed to take advantage of the country’s geographic location by strengthening its export potential. Although Jordan seeks to expand trade to areas outside the Middle East—namely the Far East, Europe and the United States—comprehensive peace is essential to its efforts to substantially increase its exports within the region.

In order to produce tangible dividends to reinforce progress towards peace, the first Middle East/North Africa (MENA) Economic Conference was convened in 1994 under the sponsorship of the World Economic Forum in Casablanka, Morocco. The Goals of the annual conference were to put MENA countries in contact with regional and international businessmen, as well as to create awareness and promote investment in the countries of the region-- all in the context of an improving climate of peace.

Jordan hosted the 1995 MENA Conference in Amman from October 29-31, further reinforcing the Kingdom's regional and international profile. In addition to providing a forum for contacts between the Jordanian private sector and interested investors, the Conference also served as an impetus for Parliament to pass investment friendly legislation such as the Investment Promotion Law, and new income and sales tax laws.

After the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, progress in the peace gradually faltered. Although a successful 1996 MENA Conference was held in Cairo, Egypt, by the time the 1997 Conference adjourned in Doha ,Qatar, the climate for regional cooperation had soured considerably. Jordan attended the MENA Conference along with several Arab states and numerous international investors, but the lack of extensive regional participation in light of the deadlocked peace process effectively put the annual MENA Conference on hold, and none was held in 1998. Jordan regrets the suspension of the MENA Conference, and hopes that it can be resumed after substantial progress is achieved toward a comprehensive regional peace.

Jordan's support for peace is thus designed to bring about immediate and tangible dividends in the short term, while removing obstacles and "ploughing the field" for future regional development. Jordan's support for the peace process is thus a mixture of the two tracks of its foreign policy--maximizing the immediate interests of the state and promoting the long-term rejuvenation of the Arab World and the Middle East.